Expert: South Asia sees major adjustments, reshaping in strategic landscape

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif speaks highly of U.S. President Trump's efforts in preventing the India-Pakistan war on October 13, 2025.

Geo-political position of India, Pakistan essentially adjusted

India's dominant position and capabilities in South Asia have been challenged by Pakistan. Although India still holds overwhelming advantages over Pakistan in terms of economic scale, military capabilities, and international influence, the brief military engagement from May 7 to 10 exposed weaknesses in India's military and punctured the "strategic bubble" that the Modi government had previously inflated through a posture of strength towards Pakistan.

What direct consequences has this brought about?

Firstly, major powers may have altered their assessment and perception of the relative importance of India and Pakistan. The United States, in particular, has directly shifted from its previous policy of "prioritizing India over Pakistan" to one of "favoring Pakistan while pressuring India."

In an effort to maintain the Modi government's domestic approval ratings, the BJP-led government has resorted to self-deceptive propaganda both domestically and internationally, which in turn has led to an even more negative international perception of the Indian government.

On the other hand, Pakistan has regained strategic confidence, and it adopted a more strategically proactive stance for a period. In September, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a joint strategic defense agreement, stipulating that an attack by a third party against either country would be considered "an act of aggression against both." Of particular widespread concern was the potential for Pakistan to "provide" its nuclear program to Saudi Arabia.

Secondly, the Trump administration recalibrated its relations with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other countries, effecting a dramatic reshaping of the South Asian strategic landscape.

In February, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as the fifth foreign leader to visit Washington, appeared to receive prioritized attention from the Trump administration. However, following the India-Pakistan "May 7" air skirmish, India instead became the target of sustained pressure and efforts to contain by the Trump administration.

President Trump not only disregarded Indian sensibilities by forging close ties with Pakistan but also publicly applied humiliating pressure on India, demanding it reduce oil purchases from Russia, imposing 50% punitive tariffs on Indian goods, and tightening visa policies for Indians traveling to the U.S.

India had hoped that hosting the Quad summit (U.S., Japan, India, Australia) in New Delhi would highlight India's strategic value in counterbalancing China. However, Trump's proposal for a U.S.-China G2 arrangement made the "strategic nightmare" of Sino-American co-governance, long feared by India's strategic community, seem on the verge of becoming reality, thoroughly unsettling India.

Beyond adjusting its policy towards India and Pakistan, the Trump administration also changed its approach towards Afghanistan's Taliban government. While not formally recognizing it, the U.S. clearly relaxed and increased its engagement with the Taliban.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits China for the 2025 SCO summit in Tianjin.

Sino-Indian relations continue to recover

From August 31 to September 1, Indian Prime Minister Modi attended the SCO Summit in Tianjin, marking the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to China in seven years. Subsequently, India eased visa restrictions for Chinese nationals, and direct flights between the two countries resumed.

However, the Indian government's relaxation of relations with China is merely tactical. Regarding issues like reciprocal journalist postings and easing restrictions on Chinese companies and investments, there has been more "thunder than rain."

India remains eager to advance the Quad security dialogue. Distrust of China remains deeply entrenched within the Indian government. The mainstream perception of China in Indian public opinion and media remains negative. India's strategic community argues that what is needed now is "strategic patience," waiting for a decline in Trump's influence so that U.S.-India relations can return to normal.

Relational shifts among South Asian countries

Since the sudden collapse of the Hasina government in Bangladesh in August 2024, the country's foreign and domestic policies have undergone a 180-degree shift.

As India-Bangladesh relations have continuously deteriorated, Bangladesh and Pakistan have moved from previous antagonism to frequent contacts and are contemplating systematic defense and security cooperation. Changes in India-Bangladesh relations have also facilitated the first trilateral meeting between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh, held in Yunnan.

Meanwhile, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations deteriorated significantly throughout 2025, escalating from frequent border clashes to multiple Pakistani airstrikes on the Afghan capital, Kabul, bringing bilateral relations to a historic low. Subsequently, in October, Afghan Foreign Minister Muttaqi visited India—the highest-level visit to India by the Afghan Taliban since taking power in 2021. India then reopened its embassy in Kabul, indirectly recognizing the legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban government.

A youth-led street movement in Nepal leads to the fall of the Nepali government in September 2025.

Domestic political changes of South Asian countries

Former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fell from power and fled into exile in Delhi in August 2024. Her party, the Bangladesh Awami League, was later declared an illegal political party by the courts.

On December 30, 2025, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Chairperson and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia passed away. Her son, Tarique Rahman, returned to Bangladesh after 17 years in exile to lead the BNP in the national elections scheduled for February 2026. This signifies the end of the political struggle between "the two women" in Bangladesh and the beginning of a new political journey.

Similarly, Nepal in September 2025 witnessed large-scale anti-corruption, anti-government protests led primarily by youth (Generation Z). The traditional political party forces in Nepal were weakened, and emerging political forces are steadily rising.

In short, 2025 was a tumultuous year for South Asian countries. In 2026, South Asia will remain fraught with uncertainty. The policies of the U.S. Trump administration towards South Asian countries are highly variable, and the elections and internal political changes in several South Asian countries add further layers of uncertainty.

Amidst the changes, however, there are constants. China has consistently been a dependable pillar for the South Asian region and its countries. In 2025, China actively mediated conflicts between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and others, committed to promoting peace, development, and stability in South Asia.

In the new year, China will remain the stabilizing anchor in the South Asia's turbulent waters, the backbone for new situations, the steadying force amid changes, the main engine for development, and the ballast in times of crisis.

Writing by Lin Minwang (Professor and Vice Dean with Institute of International Studies, Fudan University); Editing by Zhang Ruogu, Zu Hongbing and Li Tao; Translating by Wang Shixue

(The article represents the author's personal views and does not necessarily reflect the stance of Mekong News Network, YICC.)